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     he United States’ Department of Defense defines autonomous weapons 
as “weapon systems that, once activated, can select and engage targets with-
out further intervention by a human operator.”1 Autonomous weapon sys-
tems are widely predicted to be the future of war fighting, at least in the 
armed forces of highly industrialized nations.2 Consequently, there is now a 
vigorous debate going on about the ethics and policy of both the develop-
ment and deployment of such weapons.3 
                                                                                                                      
1. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, DoD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon 
Systems (2012), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf. 
2. PETER W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND 
CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2009). 
3. The literature on this topic is now too large to attempt to cite here in any detail. 
However, for some representative examples, see Kenneth Anderson & Matthew C. 
Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won't Work and How the 
Laws of War Can, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (2013), http://www.cfr.org/ 
drones/law-ethics-autonomous-weapon-systems-why-ban-wont-work-laws-war-can/p 
30445; Ronald C. Arkin, The Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned Systems, 9 JOURNAL OF 
MILITARY ETHICS 332 (2010); Peter Asaro, On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human 
Rights, Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-Making, 94 INTERNATIONAL 
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 687 (2012); Jason Borenstein, The Ethics of Autonomous Military 













A key controversy in this debate concerns the likelihood that autono-
mous weapon systems (AWS) will be capable of reliably distinguishing be-
tween civilian and military objects.4 This is obviously a crucial question and 
one that I have discussed elsewhere.5 However, for the sake of the current 
paper, I want to assume that—as seems likely—in at least some domains 
AWS will have the capacity to do this to a high degree of accuracy. While 
distinguishing insurgents from the civilian population in urban settings may 
be beyond the capacity of robots for many years yet, distinguishing be-
tween a tank and civilian cars or trucks is well within the capacity of exist-
ing systems. Moreover, in some domains, such as submarine warfare or 
missions directed at enemy air defenses, there may be no potential targets 
other than military objects.6 
                                                                                                                      
KRISHNAN, KILLER ROBOTS: LEGALITY AND ETHICALITY OF AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS 
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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW 272 (2011); Michael 
N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Out of the Loop: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of 
Armed Conflict, 4 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 231 (2013); Noel E. Sharkey, 
Cassandra or False Prophet of Doom: AI Robots and War, 23 IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS 14 
(2008); SINGER, supra note 2; Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 JOURNAL OF APPLIED 
PHILOSOPHY 62 (2007); Robert Sparrow, Robots and Respect: Assessing the Case against 
Autonomous Weapon Systems 30 ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 2016 (forthcoming).  
4. KRISHNAN, supra note 3, at 98–99; Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems 
and International Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics, HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY 
JOURNAL 1 (2013), http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Schmitt-Auton 
omous-Weapon-Systems-and-IHL-Final.pdf; Noel E. Sharkey, Autonomous Robots and the 
Automation of Warfare, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW MAGAZINE, Issue 2, 2012, at 
18; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS 
(2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload 
_0_0.pdf. 
5. Robert Sparrow, Building a Better Warbot: Ethical Issues in the Design of Unmanned 
Systems for Military Applications, 15 SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS 169 (2009); Robert 
Sparrow, Robotic Weapons and the Future of War, in NEW WARS AND NEW SOLDIERS: 
MILITARY ETHICS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 117 (Jessica Wolfendale & Paolo 
Tripodi eds., 2011). 
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A closely related but much more complex question is whether AWS are 
likely to be capable of complying with the jus in bello requirements of dis-
tinction and proportionality.7 Jus in bello is that portion of Just War Theory 
that is concerned with the legitimacy of the means used in fighting wars. 
(Very) roughly speaking, the principle of distinction requires that attacks 
only be directed at combatants, while proportionality requires that the mili-
tary advantage aimed at by an attack justifies the foreseeable evils as a result 
of it, especially—but not exclusively—any civilian casualties it might cause. 
As I have also discussed elsewhere, whether robots will ever be capable of 
making the required proportionality calculations remains highly controver-
sial.8 
However, in this article, I wish to focus on a particular aspect of this 
larger problem, which has to date received almost no discussion in the pub-
lished literature, being the question of the capacity of AWS to recognize 
surrender, and its implications for the ethical deployment of AWS.9 Im-
portantly, given my disciplinary origins in philosophy and applied ethics, 
my concern here is solely with the ethics of the use of AWS; I leave the 
question of the legality of their use in various contexts to those better qual-
ified to answer it. As I outline in Section II, a fundamental requirement of 
the jus in bello principle of distinction in Just War Theory is that combatants 
should not attack enemy units that have clearly indicated their desire to sur-
render. By ceasing to participate in hostilities and signaling surrender, mili-
tary units can acquire the moral status of non-combatants, such that delib-
erate attacks on them are no longer permissible. In section III, I argue that 
even if robots can distinguish between military and civilian objects they 
                                                                                                                      
7. Noel E. Sharkey, The Evitability of Autonomous Robot Warfare, 94 INTERNATIONAL 
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 787, 788–90 (2012); Markus Wagner, Taking Humans out of the 
Loop: Implications for International Humanitarian Law, 21 JOURNAL OF LAW INFORMATION 
AND SCIENCE 155 (2011); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 3, 24–26, 30–34. 
8. Sparrow, supra note 3. See also Sharkey, The Evitability of Autonomous Robot Warfare, 
supra note 7, at 789–90; Wagner, supra note 7. 
9. In conversation, George Lucas has suggested to me that the question of whether 
robots might be able to recognize surrender and, if so, how, was in fact one of the first 
questions to arise in discussions regarding AWS in U.S. military ethics and policy circles. 
Although Marchant et al. mentions the difficulties involved in recognizing surrender 
(Marchant et al., supra note 3) and Lieutenant Colonel Marcus Fielding flags the issues with 
which this article is concerned (Marcus Fielding, Robotics in Future Land Warfare, 3 
AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL 1 (2006), to my knowledge this article is the first in-depth 













may struggle to recognize surrender.10 The perceptual task of recognizing 
the actions that signal surrender is likely to be significantly harder than the 
task of identifying military objects, while the contextual nature of the sig-
nals used to indicate surrender implies that robots will need to be able to 
interpret and identify human intentions, which is a harder task again. In 
Section IV, I suggest three possible standards of reliability in surrender 
recognition that we might require of robots, and discuss their implications 
for the question of when robots will meet them. In Section V, after exam-
ining a number of possible ways to avoid problems that might arise as a 
result of the limited capacities of AWS to recognize surrender, I argue that 
none of them are likely to entirely succeed. In Section VI, I discuss the eth-
ics of the use of AWS that cannot reliably recognize surrender and suggest 
that thinking about two different sorts of cases may usefully clarify the is-
sues involved. We might think of AWS as being kept either on a “tight” or 
a “long” leash, depending upon how much opportunity they have for inde-
pendent operations between release and impact. I also discuss several anal-
ogies that might assist us in thinking about these questions. In the final sec-
tion, I draw out some of the implications of my discussion for the larger 
debate about the ethics of AWS and, in particular, for the vexed questions 
of whether it is more appropriate to think of these systems as weapons or 
as platforms and the locus of responsibility for civilian (and other) casual-
ties caused by them. 
 
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF SURRENDER RECOGNITION 
 
There is a powerful ethical case for conventions of war fighting that allow 
troops who wish to withdraw from participation in hostilities to surrender, 
which is that it greatly reduces the evils of war. Not only does it spare the 
lives of those who wish to surrender but it also saves the lives of those on 
the victorious side of the engagement who otherwise might have been 
killed had combat continued. These benefits—but especially the latter 
one—also establish a strong pragmatic grounds for troops to be willing to 
accept surrender and to support the development of expectations that will 
allow this practice. 
The institution of surrender is so long established and fundamental to 
the ethics of war that it is actually under-represented in the law of war. In 
                                                                                                                      
10. There is also a question about the capacity of AWS to accept surrender, which has 
been neglected as well. However, for reasons of space I will not address this issue here 












most statutes, surrender is mentioned only obliquely in connection with the 
offence of perfidy and in passing as one of the circumstances in which 
combatants may become hors de combat and thus no longer legitimate targets 
of attack.11 Nevertheless, Article 41 of Additional Protocol I, discussing 
“[s]afeguard of an enemy hors de combat,” clearly states that: 
 
1. A person who is recognized or who, in the circumstances, should be 
recognized to be ‘hors de combat’ shall not be made the object of attack. 
 
And clarifies that: 
 
2. A person is ‘hors de combat’ if: 
. . . 
(b) he clearly expresses an intention to surrender . . . 
. . . 
provided that . . . he abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to 
escape.12 
 
Correspondingly, that it is profoundly morally wrong to attack an enemy 
who has surrendered is a fundamental tenet of the customary international 
law of war and is almost universally acknowledged in the military law, 
codes and rules of operations promulgated by States.13 Moreover, Article 
23(d) of the Hague Regulations prohibits ordering that no quarter should be 
given, while Article 40 of Additional Protocol I forbids “conducting hostilities 
on the basis of a no survivors policy and threatening the enemy that there 
shall be no survivors.”14 
                                                                                                                      
11. GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL 
APPROACH 165–66 (2012). 
12. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 41, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 443 (Adam Roberts & Richard 
Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
13. See Rule 47. Attacks against Persons Hors de Combat, ICRC, https://www.icrc. 
org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule47 (last visited Aug. 4, 2015). See also Practice Re-
lating to Rule 47: Attacks against Persons Hors de Combat, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/cust 
omary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule47 (last visited Aug. 4, 2015).  
14. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Con-
vention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23, Oct. 18, 1907, 
36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 12, 
at 422; Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 40; YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF 













Thus, that there is both a legal requirement, and an ethical obligation, 
to refrain from attacking targets that have indicated the desire to surrender 
is abundantly clear. 
 
III. WHY THE RECOGNITION OF SURRENDER  
IS A HARD PROBLEM FOR ROBOTS 
 
If AWS are unable to recognize surrender, then this suggests that their de-
ployment may be ethically problematic. There is no reason, in principle, 
why recognition of surrender should be impossible for robots: if human 
beings can do it, then so too, theoretically, could an appropriately sophisti-
cated machine. Nevertheless, there are two reasons why recognizing sur-
render is likely to be difficult for robots for perhaps the next several dec-
ades. The first relates to the fact that perception is itself a notoriously hard 
task for computers. The second relates to the contextual nature of the 
means used to signal surrender in different circumstances. 
 
A. The Problem of Perception  
 
When robots were first being developed it was widely believed that the 
main challenge would be to get them to solve meaningful problems, to rea-
son and to “plan.” However, it turned out that it was actually perception—
the ability to form a model of the world and to locate themselves within it 
based upon information from their sensors—that robots struggled with 
and that has constituted the main obstacle to their use in more than a 
handful of roles.15 Despite significant progress in addressing this problem 
in recent years, robust real-time object recognition across a range of envi-
ronments by systems in motion, in natural lighting conditions, remains be-
yond the capacity of even the most sophisticated computer vision systems. 
Object recognition and classification will be particularly difficult in military 
applications given that wars often take place in complex and chaotic envi-
ronments, in various lighting conditions, and with smoke and fog obstruct-
ing the views of combatants.16 
The difficulty robots have with building up an accurate picture of the 
world is one of the reasons that some critics have been cynical about the 
capacity of AWS to reliably distinguish between military and civilian tar-
                                                                                                                      
15. RODNEY A. BROOKS, ROBOT: THE FUTURE OF FLESH AND MACHINES 36–37 
(2002). 












gets.17 However, as I suggested above, this problem may be soluble in some 
contexts. While perception in general remains a hard problem, recognition 
of specific items of interest in a scene (say, for instance, an enemy battle 
tank) is much more manageable. Indeed, some plausible targets for AWS, 
including submarines, naval vessels, fighter aircraft and radar installations, 
have distinguishing features that make recognizing them comparatively 
easy. Even the task of identifying enemy troops may be amenable to solu-
tion, for instance, by identifying every human body sized infrared heat-
signature within half a meter of a shortwave radar reflection characteristic 
of a firearm as an enemy soldier. Of course, this is only half of what is nec-
essary in order for AWS to be able to identify the presence of objects and 
persons relevant to the requirements of jus in bello. In order to be able to 
refrain from attacks that would cause disproportionate civilian casualties, a 
robot must also be capable of identifying the presence of civilians and non-
military objects in the battlespace. Again, however, I suspect that this prob-
lem may not be beyond the capacities of robots in some contexts. In anti-
submarine warfare, for instance, there are highly unlikely to be any civilian 
targets that might be mistaken for an enemy submarine. Indeed, war at sea 
more often—if not always—occurs far from civilian shipping, while the 
existence of unique acoustic profiles for every ship provides an obvious 
mechanism whereby (some) robots might recognize both civilian and mili-
tary shipping. Similarly, air-to-air combat may often proceed without con-
cerns about causing collateral damage. 
In any case, my aim here is not to settle the question of whether com-
puters are likely to be able to meet these challenges but to point out that, 
even if they can, a further and significant challenge remains. Given the 
prohibition on attacking those who have surrendered, robots must also be 
capable of perceiving the changes in orientation and force posture of com-
batants that are conventionally associated with the indication of surrender. 
This is a much more difficult task. It is one thing, for instance, to be able to 
pick out human beings in a scene and identify them as enemy soldiers, it is 
another—and much more difficult—to tell when they have dropped their 
weapons, left cover, and put their hands up. In order to be able to recog-
nize surrender, robots will not just need to be able to recognize possible 
targets but also to recognize what they are doing. 
 
                                                                                                                      
17. Id. at 98–99; Sharkey, The Evitability of Autonomous Robot Warfare, supra note 7, at 













B. The Significance of Context 
 
In fact, recognizing surrender is more difficult than even this description 
suggests. The actions that indicate surrender vary with context, both inter-
nationally, and also amongst different types of military units.18 For this rea-
son—and given the possibility that the forces involved in a conflict may be 
operating with different understandings as to the relevant conventions—
recognizing surrender is fundamentally a question of recognizing an inten-
tion. Indeed, recognizing surrender requires the capacity to identify the 
presence or absence of a number of intentions. First, surrendering involves 
the intent to cease to participate in hostilities and to place oneself under the 
control of enemy troops. Second, it involves the intention to signal this so 
that others perceive the first intention. However, there is a further inten-
tion that is necessary to surrender, which is the intention to make it such 
that a failure to perceive the intent to cease to participate in hostilities 
would be negligent or unreasonable. This third intention is necessary be-
cause there is a “performative” aspect to surrender.19 That is, as long as 
certain “felicity conditions” are met—most obviously that one has the gen-
uine intent to cease fighting—the indication of surrender just is surrender 
and, as if by magic, transforms one from being a legitimate target of attack 
to an illegitimate target. In order that such a miraculous transformation can 
be achieved, the indication of surrender must have the declarative force 
aimed at by this third intention. 
Human beings have a tremendously sophisticated and powerful capaci-
ty to interpret the actions of other human beings and to identify their in-
tentions—to “read minds”—which has been honed by millennia of pri-
mate evolution wherein the ability to know what other individuals were 
thinking and were about to do provided a crucial selective advantage.20 It 
will be extremely challenging indeed for any machine to come close to rep-
licating this. 
The problem of surrender recognition is especially hard—and the role 
of context especially important—because of the relationship between sur-
                                                                                                                      
18. STEPHEN COLEMAN, MILITARY ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION WITH CASE STUDIES 
229 (2013). 
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20. Chris D. Frith, The Social Brain?, 362 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE 
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render and “perfidy.” Essentially, perfidy is the attempt to manipulate the 
laws of war to one’s own military advantage in a fashion that would, were it 
to become widely practiced, undercut respect for those laws and, in par-
ticular, mean that it would be unreasonable to expect one’s enemy to be 
bound by them in the future.21 Feigned surrender is a paradigmatic case of 
perfidy.22 If troops who have indicated the desire to surrender recommence 
hostilities once the enemy has rendered themselves vulnerable by ceasing 
firing or moving so as to accept surrender then the opposing forces are 
unlikely to respect indications of surrender in the future. Because the insti-
tution of surrender is so valuable, but also so vulnerable to being undercut 
in this fashion, all parties to a conflict also have very strong reasons to pun-
ish instances of perfidy where they occur. 
The possibility of perfidious indications of surrender means that not 
only must robots be capable of recognizing the conventional indicators of 
surrender but they also must be capable of distinguishing between real and 
feigned intentions. There are circumstances in which it is legitimate to at-
tack enemy forces who are acting in a way that would ordinarily clearly in-
dicate a desire to surrender—when it is reasonable to conclude that, in fact, 
their intent is perfidious.23 However, the task of assessing whether a sig-
naled intention is likely to be perfidious or not is significantly more difficult 
than the task of recognizing the signal in the first place. 
Of course if a unit indicates “surrender” to an AWS and then begins 
firing immediately after the AWS has aborted its attack, it is plausible to 
think that the weapon would be capable of recognizing this as perfidy. 
However, the point is that in order to launch an attack on the same unit 
when it “surrendered” again one would have to be extremely confident in-
deed of the original identification of a (feigned) surrender and also that the 
target’s intentions were the same in this case. That is, one would have to be 
confident that the actions that one originally took to indicate surrender 
were indeed intended to convey that intention duplicitously and that this 
subsequent indication of surrender was motivated by the same intentions. 
Yet distinguishing real from feigned intentions where a target has indicated 
surrender is a very difficult task indeed. 
If a weapon was not capable of recognizing perfidy then it would be 
extremely vulnerable to being spoofed in this manner: potential targets 
would simply indicate surrender the moment they were vulnerable to being 
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attacked in order to be spared and then recommence hostilities as soon as 
the AWS had moved away.24 Such a response would be unethical and illegal 
but might go unremarked and unpunished unless the AWS was capable of 
recording/and or transmitting footage of their activities so it would be seen 
by human beings who might recognize it as perfidy and prosecute it as 
such. If the AWS were unable to transmit data to another location at the 
time then such instances of perfidious surrender might even go unpunished 
if the AWS was destroyed during the course of the engagement. 
The contextual nature of the signals used to indicate surrender and the 
conceptual connection between surrender and perfidy mean that it will be 
extremely difficult for robots to recognize surrender in many contexts. 
 
IV. HOW RELIABLE MUST A ROBOT BE? 
 
Of course, human beings often fail to recognize surrender in war, with 
tragic results. It might therefore be argued that all that is required of robots 
in order to avoid any ethical problems arising out of the difficulties of rec-
ognizing surrender is that they should be capable of doing so at least as 
well as human warfighters. Once a robot can meet this standard, it will be 
no more likely to attack a surrendered target than would be a human warf-
ighter; once it exceeds it, replacing human warfighters with robots in the 
same role will save the lives of (some) surrendered troops.25 
                                                                                                                      
24. If—as seems likely—AWS are unable to accept surrender by taking surrendered 
forces into custody, this may further complicate the proper interpretation of intentions. If 
the enemy knows that AWS have no capacity to take them prisoner, they might well sur-
render to an AWS, knowing when they do so that this will serve to protect them from 
attack while having no implications for their long-term capacity to participate in the armed 
conflict. Moreover, if there is no manned unit nearby capable of taking them prisoner, 
they would indeed be within their rights to take up arms to rejoin the conflict after a rea-
sonable period of time has elapsed. However, awareness of this possibility might in turn 
lead the parties to a conflict to suspect all indications of surrender to AWS as perfidious, 
which would be disastrous. My thanks to Dr. Shane Dunn of the Australian Defence Sci-
ence and Technology Organisation for drawing my attention to this issue. 
If one believes that it is not possible to surrender unless there is a unit capable of ac-
cepting the surrender and taking effective control of the surrendered forces as Coleman 
indicates (id. at 233), then in all likelihood it would be impossible to surrender to an AWS. 
This would absolve these systems of any requirement of being capable of recognizing sur-
render, but arguably at the cost of rendering them unethical in a wide range of roles. This 
will be discussed further below. 
25. Ronald Arkin, Lethal Autonomous Systems and the Plight of the Non-Combatant 137 












However, as I will argue further below, this claim is properly contro-
versial: we might well expect more of robots than this. To avoid prejudging 
this controversy, then, let me stipulate that, in what follows, I will use the 
term “reliable surrender recognition” to mean whatever standard would be 
required in order to avoid the specific set of ethical issues that might arise 
as a result of any inability of AWS to detect surrender. With this stipulation 
in hand we can then proceed to examine the question of precisely where 
this standard should be set, which in turn will determine the likelihood that 
robots will be capable of achieving it within any given time frame. 
There are, I think, at least two—but arguably three—places at which 
we might fix the standard for “reliability” in surrender recognition. 
As suggested above, we might judge robots reliable when they achieve 
or approach the performance of actual human warfighters in the field when 
it comes to the recognition of surrender: call this first standard, the “empir-
ical standard of human warfighters.”26 
Importantly though, we already expect more than this of human warf-
ighters. The actual performance of human beings in wartime is inevitably 
significantly less than our moral expectations with regard to surrender 
recognition because in reality human beings are sometimes negligent in 
their efforts to determine whether an enemy has surrendered or perhaps do 
not even bother to try to do so. At the very least, what we expect of human 
warfighters is that they make every reasonable effort to determine whether 
or not enemy troops have surrendered before they attack them. Thus, we 
might judge robots reliable at surrender recognition when they reach or 
approach the standard of performance of human beings who are meeting 
their moral obligations in this regard: call this second possible place at 
which to fix the standard for reliability the “reasonable expectation stand-
ard.”  
However, it might be argued that the reasonable expectation standard 
mistakes an account of how we should evaluate agents for an account of 
their obligations. While we may not wish to blame or condemn warfighters 
who fail to meet this standard, what warfighters are actually required to do 
is to never attack a surrendered target. We might therefore only judge robots 
reliable at recognizing surrender when they approach 100 percent accuracy 
in the task of recognizing which enemy forces have surrendered and which 
                                                                                                                      
26. Arkin suggests and defends this standard eloquently, albeit in the context of a dis-
cussion of the general requirement to target only combatants rather than the question of 
surrender recognition in particular. See id.; Arkin, The Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned 













have not: call this third—most demanding—standard, the standard of 
“perfection.”27 
How hard it will be for robots to detect surrender reliably—and conse-
quently when they are likely to be able to do so—will depend upon which 
of these standards we believe is appropriate. Those who proffer a conse-
quentialist account of the justification of the principles of jus in bello should 
clearly favor the first of these standards; once robots can meet this stand-
ard their use will reduce the evils of war. However, those who are inclined 
to understand the principle of distinction, in particular, as justified by a 
Kantian ethics or by deontological concerns more generally,28 should favor 
at least the reasonable expectation standard and might be tempted to insist 
on (near) perfect recognition. To insist on the reasonable expectation 
standard is just to insist that we do not owe surrendered combatants any 
less when we send a robot rather than a human being into combat. The 
case for expecting (near) perfect recognition from robots is more tenden-
tious but still, I think, arguable. Despite their extraordinary capabilities, 
human beings are cognitively limited systems with an even more limited set 
of perceptual powers. In contrast, there is no obvious upper limit on the 
performance of a machine at recognizing objects or intentions. When it 
comes to the appropriate ethical standards to impose on the performance 
of robots, then, there is no reason why we should take the performance of 
human beings as definitive. Given that surrendered combatants have a 
right to be protected entirely against attack, it might be argued that this is the 
appropriate standard to demand of a machine.29 
I am not going to attempt to settle here which of these is the appropri-
ate standard to expect of robots when it comes to reliability at surrender 
recognition, which is a matter best settled in the context of a larger debate 
about the standards of ethical performance we should expect of robots. 
However, given the challenges involved in recognizing surrender, discussed 
above, even if we settle for the lowest of these, the empirical standard of 
                                                                                                                      
27. As the concept of reliability allows for the possibility of occasional failures, it is 
not plausible to demand perfect accuracy in order to judge a system reliable. However, near 
perfect accuracy is a plausible—if demanding—standard of reliability in some contexts. 
28. Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, 1 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 123 
(1972). 
29. Again, given that it is impossible to demonstrate that a system is 100 percent reli-
able (even if a system has never failed, it remains possible that it will do so in the future), it 













human warfighters, it may be some time yet before robots are capable of 
reliably recognizing surrender. 
 
V. FOUR POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS? 
 
Thus far I have been concerned to establish only that detecting surrender is 
likely to be difficult for AWS and consequently that they may be unable to 
do so reliably for some years or perhaps even decades. It does not (yet) fol-
low from this that their use would be unethical. In particular, if it is plausi-
ble to assign responsibility for the task of determining whether a target has 
surrendered or not to the person who launches the weapon, the inability of 
the weapon itself to detect surrender may pose no barrier to its ethical use. 
On the other hand, as I will discuss further below, for weapons with a long 
loiter time or a large degree of independence when it comes to determining 
which target they will attack, we might wonder whether this solution is 
available.  
However, before turning to examine these questions, I want to first 
consider four different sets of policy responses, which, if successful, might 
avoid the need to confront them. Requiring AWS to seek permission from 
a human controller before initiating an attack would prevent the need for 
the weapon itself to be able to recognize surrender. Radically constraining 
the nature of possible targets of AWS or the munitions they could deploy, 
revising conventions regarding surrender so that all military units carried 
“surrender beacons,” or confining the use of AWS to particular domains 
might either make it much easier for robots to recognize surrender or miti-
gate the need for them to do so. 
 
A. Requiring Permission to Attack from a Human Controller 
 
The desire to placate widespread public unease about the prospect of ro-
bots being granted the power to kill, plus the widely acknowledged difficul-
ties involved in producing “ethical” robots, have led a number of commen-
tators to suggest that autonomous weapon systems could be required to 
seek permission from a human controller or supervisor before deploying 













cal deliberation required to determine whether or not an attack is permissi-
ble is beyond the capacities of the robot.30 
However, there are two obvious difficulties with this proposal as a so-
lution to the problems involved in surrender recognition. First, unless the 
robot was required to seek permission before each and every attack, this 
would not avoid the problems associated with the possibility of false nega-
tives (that is, where the robot wrongly decides that a target is not surren-
dering—and is therefore a legitimate target). Second, and more important-
ly, requiring robots to seek permission from human beings before attacking 
targets would render them unable to carry out attacks in circumstances 
where communications were denied or otherwise unavailable or where the 
tempo of battle means that human beings cannot make good decisions in 
the time available to them. As the capacity to operate in environments 
where communications are unavailable or unreliable31 and to make deci-
sions faster than human beings32 are two of the main advantages of AWS 
over manned and tele-operated systems, sacrificing these would mean sacri-
ficing many of the benefits of AWS. Indeed, a system that required permis-
sion from a human operator before it could attack a target would not be 
able to “select and engage targets without a human operator” and would 
therefore not constitute an autonomous weapon system according to the 
definition I cited above when operated in this fashion. 
 
B. Radically Constrain the Nature of Possible Targets or the Munitions Deployed by 
AWS? 
 
Another workaround, which would allow AWS to operate across a wide 
range of domains but that might avoid ethical problems associated with any 
inability of AWS to recognize surrender, would be to radically constrain the 
                                                                                                                      
30. Asaro, supra note 3, at 702; Brutzman et al., supra note 6; James R. Fitzsimonds & 
Thomas G. Mahnken, Military Officer Attitudes toward UAV Adoption: Exploring Institutional 
Impediments to Innovation, 46 JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY 96, 101, 103 (2007); Hyder Gulam 
& Simon W. Lee, Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles and the Law of Armed Conflict, 3 
AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL 123, 132 (2006); Henry S. Kenyon, Israel Deploys Robot 
Guardians, 60 SIGNAL 41, 43 (2006); Alex Leveringhaus & Tjerk de Greef, Autonomous 
Weapons: A Qualified Defence, in PRECISION-STRIKE TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL 
INTERVENTION: STRATEGIC, LEGAL AND MORAL IMPLICATIONS 206 (Mike Aaronson et 
al. eds., 2014). 
31. Anderson & Waxman, supra note 3, at 7; Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 3, at 238. 
32. Thomas K. Adams, Future Warfare and the Decline of Human Decisionmaking, 












targets AWS were tasked to attack, or the sorts of weapons with which they 
were armed. John Canning, who was (and is) an influential figure in the 
initial debate about the ethics of AWS in U.S. policy circles, was an early 
and strong advocate of this option.33 In order to minimize the chance of 
attacking a surrendered force, AWS might be programmed to attack only: 
(1) other unmanned systems; (2) forces that are actively firing their weap-
ons at the time; or, (3) the enemy’s weapons rather than persons or (whole) 
systems. Alternatively, we might only arm autonomous weapon systems 
with non-lethal weapons so as to avoid the risk of killing surrendered 
troops. While each of these possible solutions has its merits, unfortunately 
they either do not succeed entirely in removing the need for AWS to be 
able to recognize surrender, or they very seriously restrict the nature of the 
operations that AWS could carry out and therefore their military utility—or 
both. 
The idea that wars of the future might be confined to battles between 
robots frequently comes up in discussions of the ethics of AWS, although 
in my experience it often reflects the desire to avoid engaging seriously 
with these issues rather than any real faith that such a circumstance will 
ever come about. Nevertheless, if AWS were tasked only with attacking 
other unmanned systems, it is true that this would avoid any need to be 
able to recognize surrender, as presumably there is no moral requirement 
not to attack “surrendered” targets except in the case where human lives 
are directly at stake.34 The obvious cost of this solution, however, would be 
to massively restrict the military utility of AWS. Indeed, if AWS could only 
ethically be deployed against other AWS, there would be little incentive to 
develop such weapons in the first place. 
Similarly, enemy units that are actively firing their weapons have clearly 
not surrendered and so concerns about the risks of attacking surrendered 
                                                                                                                      
33. John S. Canning, A Concept of Operations for Armed Autonomous Systems, 3RD 
ANNUAL DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE, Washington, DC 2006, available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2006disruptive_tech/canning.pdf; John S. Canning, You’ve Just 
Been Disarmed. Have a Nice Day!, 28 IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE 12 
(2009). 
34. Of course, this approach substitutes the problem of distinguishing between 
manned and unmanned systems for the problem of recognizing surrender. In some con-
texts, the former task may not be straightforward. For instance, robotic tanks may look 
very much like manned tanks. For that matter, in the future many military systems may 
have the capacity to function either as manned or unmanned systems. However, if it were 
possible to be confident that a potential target was unmanned, then there need be little 













troops pose no barrier to attacking them. Again, however, restricting op-
erations of AWS in this way would sacrifice a good portion of their military 
potential. One imagines that enemy troops would quickly learn to stop fir-
ing when AWS were within striking range—and it would be entirely ethical 
for them to do so; it is not perfidious to cease firing when confronted by 
superior enemy force in the hope of escaping their attention or of not be-
ing judged worthy of attack in the circumstances. While a weapon that 
could effectively suppress enemy fire merely by loitering in the area would 
have significant military utility, such a weapon could still not play a number 
of other militarily valuable roles, including attacking units that were strate-
gically emplaced or maneuvering. 
Targeting only enemy weapons or deploying only non-lethal munitions 
from AWS would not reduce the difficulty of determining whether or not 
an enemy unit wishes to surrender, but would reduce the risk of killing sur-
rendered troops.35 Unfortunately, because neither of these policies would 
reduce this risk to zero, they do not mitigate the requirement not to attack 
surrendered units. Any projectile or energy emission powerful enough to 
disable an enemy’s weapons will usually impose some risk to human life. 
For instance, even low-energy kinetic attacks on artillery pieces, tank can-
non, or the missile rails of aircraft, risk killing their crew, while attacking 
naval guns may hole the ship and endanger the lives of everyone on board. 
“Non-lethal” weapons are better described as “sub-lethal” since almost all 
carry some risk of killing people in particular circumstances.36 Rubber bul-
lets may strike people in the temples or eye sockets, gases may cause asth-
matics to asphyxiate, microwave-based area denial weapons may cause 
heart attacks or burns on those who are unable to leave the area of effect 
for some reason, etc. For these reasons, forces that have surrendered have 
the right not to be attacked even with weapons of this sort.37 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
35. See Canning, A Concept of Operations for Armed Autonomous Systems, supra note 33; 
Canning, You’ve Just Been Disarmed. Have a Nice Day!, supra note 33. 
36. In fairness to Canning, in his publications he imagines AWS being armed with 
weapons that are capable of disarming soldiers without harming them (he mentions, for 
instance, the use of diamond tip saws to destroy rifles): my point here is effectively to dis-
pute the likelihood and practicality of this scenario in practice. 
37. Presuming that they are complying with the reasonable directives of the forces to 












C. Surrender Beacons? 
 
To this point I have been discussing how an AWS might recognize surren-
der and presuming (if implicitly) that, if they cannot do so reliably, this may 
exclude their use in some circumstances. However, the history of warfare 
contains many examples of weapons that were morally controversial when 
first invented nevertheless being deployed for the sake of military ad-
vantage, whereupon the way in which wars are fought and the legal and eth-
ical conventions governing military conduct each evolved to take account 
of the new weapons. With this history in mind, then, one might instead 
frame the ethical question as “What are the obligations on military forces 
as a result of the need to clearly convey surrender to AWS with the limita-
tions I have described above, given that in all probability these weapons 
will be deployed in a wide range of roles in future conflicts?” 
One option would be to insist that troops should be capable of com-
municating surrender to AWS. For instance, were all military units to carry 
electronic devices capable of emitting an internationally agreed upon “sur-
render signal” on an agreed-upon frequency, then activating this beacon 
would serve to protect them from attack by AWS should they wish to sur-
render. It is perhaps plausible to imagine such a system being fitted to air-
craft, naval systems, and armored units, where it would also have the ad-
vantage of facilitating surrender to human forces. Unfortunately, however, 
it is a bit more of a stretch to imagine every infantry unit in the world car-
rying such a device, let alone every soldier—and it is wildly implausible to 
imagine that irregular militias and insurgents will have the resources to 
equip their members with an electronic beacon in order to facilitate surren-
der to AWS. While there are, of course, questions about the proprietary of 
the participation of such forces in armed conflict, where they are involved 
it is both morally incumbent and politically advantageous to be able to rec-
ognize and accept their surrender. At most then, such a convention would 
only be a partial solution to the problem of surrender recognition and 
might succeed only in conflicts involving regular forces on both sides.38 
                                                                                                                      
38. Radio beacons—and a convention regarding their use—would solve another prob-
lem that is likely to beset (some) autonomous systems, which is the need to be able to 
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more plausible to expect that any ship that wishes to cease to participate in hostilities in 
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Moreover, the introduction of such beacons would only solve the 
problem posed by the introduction of AWS if it was accompanied by a fur-
ther radical modification of existing conventions regarding surrender, 
which we should countenance only after careful deliberation, if at all. That 
is, it would have to become an established understanding that military units 
remain legitimate targets unless they have activated their beacons, with all 
other means of surrender ruled out. Otherwise, AWS would still need to be 
capable of recognizing surrender by (all the various) conventional means. 
Adopting such a policy would obviously be disastrous for any troops who 
had been separated from their surrender beacons or whose surrender bea-
cons had become inoperable for some reason, as they would then be una-
ble to surrender to an AWS.  
Whether such a circumstance—and the policy that produced it—would 
be acceptable or not is, I think, a contestable matter. On the one hand, as 
noted above, it is explicitly forbidden to order that there should be “no 
quarter given,” which suggest that it would be problematic to deploy a 
weapon that might attack troops who were clearly—if not to the ma-
chine—indicating the desire to surrender. On the other hand, no person or 
policy can guarantee that every attempt to surrender will be successful: 
there will always be—tragic—situations where signals are missed or inten-
tions misunderstood. It might therefore be argued that providing AWS 
with the capacity to recognize surrender beacons in the context of a con-
vention which requires military units to carry such beacons exhausted the 
obligations of the designers of these weapons.  
 
D. Confining the Use of AWS to Particular Domains 
 
Like excluding the presence of civilian objects, recognizing surrender is a 
more tractable problem in some sorts of warfare than others. It is extreme-
ly difficult when targeting infantry or irregular forces in urban or jungle 
environments because both the difficulties posed by perception and by the 
importance of context are at their most acute in this setting. Yet it is effec-
tively non-existent in air-to-air combat, where there are currently no wide-
ly-agreed upon mechanisms to allow aircraft to surrender. In several other 
types of warfare, the conventions regarding surrender make it much more 
plausible to think that robots could recognize surrender with a high degree 
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of accuracy. In combat between armored vehicles, for instance, units that 
wish to indicate surrender typically reverse the turret of the tank, open the 
crew hatches, and place themselves on top of—or alongside of—the vehi-
cle. It is plausible to think that robots might be capable of recognizing 
this.39 In operations conducted against submarines, submarines surrender 
by communicating their intentions via “underwater telephone” or by sur-
facing and flying a white flag while the crew takes to the deck or the boats, 
which again robots might be capable of recognizing.40 The flags and lights 
that naval vessels use to indicate surrender are also the sorts of signals that 
machines are already reasonably competent at detecting and interpreting. 
Thus, by confining AWS to roles in which they are tasked with attacking 
only targets of these sorts, it would be possible either to avoid the prob-
lems associated with recognizing surrender (in the case of air-to-air com-
bat) or to make it much more likely that robots could recognize surrender. 
Of the possible policy solutions I have considered here, this is the one 
that I believe offers the best prospects of allowing AWS to play a valuable 
military role without courting ethical controversy due to an inability to rec-
ognize surrender.41 However, even this approach is likely to significantly 
restrict the sorts of warfare in which AWS could be used. 
 
VI. IF ROBOTS CANNOT RELIABLY RECOGNIZE SURRENDER . . .  
 
None of the approaches I have surveyed thus far succeed, therefore, in 
avoiding the ethical issues associated with a lack of capacity to reliably rec-
ognize surrender without imposing severe restrictions on the roles in which 
they may be used. Of course, it might also be possible to combine the vari-
ous approaches I have discussed here in different ways in order to allow 
AWS to operate in more domains or attack a wider variety of targets whilst 
still (mostly) being able to recognize surrender. For reasons of space I can-
not consider all the possible options here. However, I hope my discussion 
of the promise and limitations of each approach will prove useful to such a 
project. 
                                                                                                                      
39. Admittedly, this does not resolve the problems arising out of the possibility of 
perfidious surrender. 
40. My thanks to Rob McLaughlin for clarifying these conventions for me. 
41. Note that this was effectively the approach adopted with the United States’ MK 
60 CAPTOR (encapsulated torpedo) antisubmarine mine, which arguably should be classi-
fied as an autonomous weapon system: as this weapon was designed to target only enemy 













For the remainder of this article, I wish to consider the ethics of de-
ploying AWS that cannot reliably recognize surrender. I want to suggest 
that two different ways of framing this issue produce very different results. 
In cases where there is a limited window of opportunity for targets to sur-
render between an AWS being released and its impact, the necessity for the 
AWS to be able to recognize surrender is greatly diminished: I will refer to 
this as the AWS being “on a tight leash.”42 However, in cases where the 
AWS may travel or loiter for a significant period between release and de-
struction of its target or (perhaps) where the AWS has a high degree of au-
tonomy regarding which particular target it will attack, the requirement that 
the AWS be capable of reliably detecting surrender is much more pressing: 
I will refer to this as the AWS being “on a long leash.” Moreover, I suggest, 
there are existing or historical analogies that are foregrounded by adopting 
each approach. Thus, we may be able to make significant progress on re-
solving the ethics of the use of AWS if we can decide which of these ways 
of framing is more appropriate in any particular case. 
 
A. AWS on a Tight Leash? 
 
Where AWS travel at very high speeds (or where they are used at short 
range) and where they are tasked with selecting amongst a small number of 
targets that are already under direct observation when the AWS is 
launched, it might be argued that there is no need for the AWS to be capa-
ble of recognizing surrender. Instead, it would be up to the human being 
who launches the AWS to ensure that any of the potential targets were not 
signaling surrender before they release the AWS.  
The plausibility of this approach is suggested by consideration of a hy-
pothetical scenario involving a weapon that has been in operation for near-
ly a century—a “dumb” torpedo—or, perhaps more plausibly, another 
contemporary weapon—a “fire-and-forget” torpedo with an active sonar 
homing system. Because such weapons may travel in the water for a num-
ber of minutes between firing and reaching their target, it is theoretically 
                                                                                                                      
42. I have struggled to find a form of words to describe the ultimate destructive ef-
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in this article. I have therefore settled for speaking of the “impact” or “strike” of an AWS 
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possible that the enemy vessel being targeted might indicate surrender be-
tween the launch of the weapon and its impact.43 Were such a thing to 
happen, the destruction of the surrendered vessel would be a tragedy, but 
not a war crime. As long as the target was a legitimate target when the 
weapon was launched and had made no indication that it wished to surren-
der or (perhaps) was about to surrender, then the person who authorized 
the release of the weapon bears no moral responsibility for the tragic out-
come. Moreover, while we might wish that it were possible to abort the 
torpedo’s run once it became apparent that the target had surrendered, it 
does not seem as though there is any ethical problem arising from the fact 
that the torpedo itself is not capable of recognizing surrender and aborting 
its attack. If we believe that this is an appropriate analogy than it may seem 
that an inability to detect surrender need not prohibit the ethical use of 
AWS. 
 
B. AWS on a Long Leash? 
 
While weapons systems capable of choosing between a limited number of 
targets and operating over a narrow timeframe will qualify as AWS, there is 
a sense in which they are not “very” autonomous. Much of the military po-
tential of AWS consists in their (theoretical) capacity to operate with very 
long loiter times and to engage targets of opportunity that may not have 
been explicitly singled out for attack when the system was launched. We 
might therefore think of such systems as operating on a “long leash.” A 
paradigmatic example of an AWS operated on a long leash, for instance, 
might involve an autonomous hunter-killer Unmanned Undersea Vehicle 
(UUV) tasked with attacking all military shipping within some geograph-
ically defined (wide) area.44 
                                                                                                                      
43. Unclassified sources suggest that the U.S.’s Mk 48 ADCAP heavyweight torpedo 
might travel for as long as forty minutes between launch and impact when used to attack a 
target at maximum range (see range and speed figures given at Background Information: Mk 
48 ADCAP, JANE’S NAVAL FORCES (Feb. 2, 2001), http://web.archive.org/web/20010 
401035621/http:/www.janes.com/defence/naval_forces/news/juws/juws010202_1_n.sh
tml), while several of the heavyweight torpedoes fielded by other nations might travel for 
approximately thirty minutes (Malcolm Fuller, Silent Might: Heavyweight Torpedoes Still Pack a 
Punch, JANE’S NAVY INTERNATIONAL (May 27, 2010), https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPag 
es/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=+++1207877&Pubabbrev=JNI).  
44. The U.S. Office of Naval Research (ONR) has announced its interest in providing 
the U.S. Navy’s Large Displacement Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (LDUUV) with an An-













Whether operating on a long leash is any different to operating on a 
tight leash, morally speaking, is, I think, the central question when it comes 
to the ethics of the use of AWS that are unable to reliably recognize sur-
render.45 
At the very least, the chances of a target surrendering between the 
launch of the AWS and its impact are larger when AWS are operating on a 
long leash. This increase is not proportional with time, as one presumes 
that surrendered targets would, after some discrete period of time, be taken 
into custody and exit the battlespace. Nevertheless, it is clear that AWS op-
erating on a long leash have a significantly greater chance of encountering a 
surrendered target. Moreover, the person who authorizes the release of the 
AWS has little sense of whether particular targets have surrendered or are 
about to surrender. 
However, it might be argued that this fact does not distinguish the eth-
ics of operating AWS on a long leash from the ethics of operating them on 
a tight leash, as in each case responsibility for the consequences of the at-
tack rest with the person who authorizes the launch of the AWS.46 Accord-
ing to this way of thinking, as long as the chance of striking a surrendered 
target does not exceed some reasonable threshold, there will be nothing 
ethically problematic about using the AWS. This calculation will need to 
take into account both the capacities of the AWS to recognize surrender (in 
what percentage of cases does it fail to do so?) and the chance that a target 
might have surrendered between launch and impact, which in turn will de-
pend on the AWS’s role, area of operations, and targeting criteria. 
Yet, this sanguine attitude might be challenged in two ways. 
First, even where the risk of attacking a surrendered target is judged ac-
ceptable, it might be argued that making this calculation is not sufficient to 
count as taking “reasonable precautions” to avoid attacking surrendered 
targets in the circumstances.47 When AWS are being used on a long leash, 
when it comes to any particular target engaged by the AWS, no human be-
ing has assessed whether that target has surrendered or not, while (ex hy-
                                                                                                                      
Large UUV, JANE’S NAVY INTERNATIONAL (Nov. 20, 2014), https://janes.ihs.com/Custo 
mPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=+++1729177&Pubabbrev=J
NI), which suggests that this prospect is more than hypothetical. 
45. Fielding, supra note 9, at 102. 
46. Schmitt, supra note 4. 
47. Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 57(2)(a). For discussion of the nature and 
significance of the obligation on warfighters to take reasonable precautions in attack, see: 
DINSTEIN, supra note 14, at 125–28; A. P. V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 125–74 












pothesi) the AWS itself is not capable of reliably determining this. If we un-
derstand the requirement to take reasonable precautions as being founded 
in an obligation to the particular person whose life is on the line when the 
attack is being contemplated, rather than as a product of a generalized obli-
gation to avoid non-combatant casualties, then it is arguable that the calcu-
lation before launch that the AWS is unlikely to attack a surrendered target 
is not sufficient to exhaust this obligation.48 
Second—and relatedly—the use of AWS on a long leash might be 
thought to run afoul of the prohibition on issuing orders that there should 
be “no quarter” given. This objection seems especially compelling if one 
believes that enemy forces cannot surrender to an AWS because the AWS 
has no means of “accepting” surrender.49 If this is true then although it re-
moves the necessity for AWS to be capable of recognizing surrender it also 
would, I believe, prohibit using them on a long leash. Even if one denies—
as I believe we should—that the lack of the capacity of AWS to render en-
emy combatants who wish to surrender prisoners of war excuses them 
from the requirement to be able to recognize surrender, the prohibition on 
ordering that there shall be no quarter given might be thought to render 
the use of AWS on a long leash morally problematic. In such a circum-
stance, enemy forces who wish to surrender may have no opportunity to 
do so because the AWS fails to recognize their attempt; moreover, the per-
son who authorized the release of the AWS was (or at least should have 
been) aware of this when the system was deployed. Of course, strictly 
speaking, the intention of those deploying an AWS need not be that units 
should have no opportunity to surrender (they might, for example, plausibly 
wish that the system they were using was more capable of recognizing sur-
render); rather, they are guilty of employing a means of warfare that fails to 
safeguard the opportunity to surrender. Whether this objection will have 
force or not in such cases will, therefore, depend on whether the prohibi-
tion on ordering that no quarter should be given is understood as requiring 
combatants to safeguard the opportunity to surrender or merely not to in-
tentionally deny it absolutely.50 
                                                                                                                      
48. Just how plausible it would be to attempt to ground the obligation to take reason-
able precautions in attack along these lines is a further question, which reasons of space 
prevent me from attempting to answer here. 
49. COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 233. 
50. As Coleman notes, combatants are typically not held to be under an obligation to 













According to each of these objections, then, the period of time be-
tween the release and the impact of the AWS is morally significant by virtue 
of the extent to which it moves the burden of recognizing surrender from 
the person authorizing the release of the AWS to the system itself. 
In some ways, the issues in the debate on the ethics of operating AWS 
on a “long leash” are similar to those in the historical (and ongoing) debate 
about the ethics of mine warfare. Mines may detonate long after they are 
emplaced and without regard to whether or not their targets have surren-
dered (or, indeed, are combatants at all). The lack of control that those who 
emplace or lay mines have over the nature of the targets the mines attack 
has led to mines becoming controversial. Anti-personnel mines are banned 
by the Ottawa Convention, while, in naval warfare, the use of free-floating 
contact mines that do not become harmless one hour after they are de-
ployed is explicitly prohibited by Article 1(1) of Hague Convention VIII.51 
Critics of AWS might push this analogy in order to insist that the use of 
AWS on a long leash should similarly be prohibited on the grounds that 
those who deploy them cannot adequately control where they strike. En-
thusiasts for AWS are likely to reply that contemporary anti-tank and teth-
ered naval influence mines are capable of a high degree of discrimination 
between civilian and military targets and are not prohibited by IHL, despite 
the fact that they cannot recognize surrender. While evocative, then, the 
analogy with mine warfare seems unlikely to settle the question of the eth-
ics of the use on a long leash of AWS that cannot recognize surrender. 
Ultimately, I remain conflicted about such use of AWS. If the chance 
of them striking a surrendered target is low enough—taking into account 
both their capacity to recognize a surrendered target and the chance that 
they will encounter a surrendered target given their role, area of operations, 
and targeting criteria—then perhaps it would be ethical for the person au-
thorizing the release of the AWS to accept responsibility for the conse-
quences of its deployment, including the possibility that the system will at-
tack a surrendered target. Yet the intuition that it would be wrong to 
launch a system that might strike a target months later, regardless of 
                                                                                                                      
51. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 17, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211, 
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whether or not it had surrendered, remains. As my own thinking on this 
topic remains unsettled, I can only hope that my treatment here will help 
others in their thinking about these issues. 
 
VII. PLATFORMS, WEAPONS, AND RESPONSIBILITY 
 
The preceding discussion intersects at a number of points with discussions 
of two key controversies in the larger debate about the ethics of AWS: the 
appropriate locus of moral responsibility for casualties produced by AWS; 
and whether AWS should be thought of as either weapons or weapon plat-
forms. A brief consideration of these points of intersection may, I hope, 
cast some light on these questions as well as on the ethics of the use of 
AWS that are unable to reliably recognize surrender. 
One of the first controversies to erupt as the prospect of AWS 
emerged concerned the question of the appropriate locus of responsibility 
for deaths caused by these systems. Critics alleged that the development of 
AWS risked no one being responsible for the consequences of their use.52 
The person who releases the weapon cannot be held responsible for the 
choices and decisions of the robot, while the robot itself is not the sort of 
thing that can be held morally responsible; thus, a “responsibility gap” 
emerges.53 This claim remains contested and a number of authorities have 
argued that the attribution of responsibility to the person who authorizes 
the release of the weapon is, in fact, straightforward, with talk of a “re-
sponsibility gap” obfuscating this by misattributing a mysterious quasi-
moral agency to robots.54 
Whether AWS should be thought of as weapons or platforms is con-
troversial because of various proposals to prohibit AWS by means of inter-
national law.55 If there is, as some have argued, something especially wrong 
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about killing people with robots56—and robots are weapons—then it is 
possible (although obviously controversial) that they should be considered 
mala in se and prohibited as such.57 If, on the other hand, AWS are better 
thought of as platforms (which might be used to deliver different sorts of 
weapons) then it would be difficult indeed to explain how the mere fact 
that a weapon was mounted on an AWS should make it an “evil means” 
for killing; moreover, there is little historical precedent for banning a plat-
form. 
These two controversies are already intertwined: if we assign responsi-
bility to the person who uses the AWS to kill, then the robot is clearly the 
means by which they kill—and thus a weapon; moreover, the possibility 
opens up that this means itself might be morally problematic. If AWS are 
platforms then they attack targets with weapons and it is most natural to 
look to assign responsibility for targeting decisions to the controller (the 
computer) on the platform. However, this dialectic becomes still clearer in 
the light of the preceding discussion of the ethics of surrender recognition.  
Notice, for instance, how my treatment of the ethics of the use of AWS 
on a tight leash assigns responsibility to the person who launches the AWS 
and treats AWS as analogous to other weapons, which might also occasional-
ly strike surrendered targets. Yet this has a number of challenging implica-
tions for the ethics of the use of AWS that are unable to reliably recognize 
surrender. If AWS are weapons, then launching an AWS is launching an 
attack. Moreover, it seems most natural to think of this as launching an at-
tack against all of the targets that the AWS might in fact strike.58 If includ-
ing a military unit within the targeting criteria of an AWS counts as attack-
ing that unit, though, then the chance of attacking a surrendered target in-
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creases with the size of the weapon’s target set regardless of the capacity of the 
AWS to detect surrender.59 
This implication in turn suggests that the use of AWS on a long leash 
will be problematic while they are unable to reliably recognize surrender: 
AWS on a long leash will tend to have larger target sets, both because hav-
ing more autonomy to select targets is one way in which an AWS may count 
as being on a long leash and because the longer the period between the re-
lease of an AWS and its impact, the more opportunity there is for unantici-
pated targets to happen to fulfill its targeting criteria. Interestingly, then, if 
AWS that are unable to reliably recognize surrender are to be used on a 
long leash, then a “responsibility gap” is actually required, lest the operator 
be implicated in “attacking” a surrendered target when any of the enemy 
forces in the target set of an autonomous weapon surrenders. Conceiving 
of these systems as platforms which themselves launch attacks is one way 
to open up this gap. Of course, if we do have the intuition that it is im-
portant that someone should be held morally responsible for each and eve-
ry use of lethal force in the course of war,60 then the use of AWS on a long 
leash may be problematic for this reason. Thinking about the ethics of sur-
render recognition highlights the persistence and significance of intuitions 
about the attribution of responsibility even where the nature of the AWS is 
not such as to raise questions about its moral agency.61 
I do not pretend to have attempted to settle here either the appropriate 
locus for the attribution of responsibility for casualties produced by AWS 
or the question of whether (or, better, perhaps, which) AWS should be 
thought of as weapons or platforms: these are matters for a much larger—
and longer—debate. Again, my hope is merely that these reflections on the 
ethics of the use of AWS that are unable to reliably recognize surrender 
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I have argued that the difficulties involved in accurately identifying the na-
ture of the actions of potential targets and the role played by context in 
determining surrender mean that the recognition of surrender will be a pro-
found challenge for autonomous weapon systems. Even if we ask only that 
robots be capable of recognizing surrender at close to the level achieved by 
human beings in wartime, reliable surrender recognition may be beyond the 
capacity of machines, in some contexts at least, for some years to come. A 
lack of the capacity to reliably recognize surrender would not rule out the 
ethical use of AWS in certain roles where the question of surrender recog-
nition seldom, if ever, arises, such as attacks on aircraft in flight or subma-
rines while submerged. Moreover, various policies, discussed in Section V, 
or combinations thereof, might mitigate the danger of attacking surren-
dered targets in some (other) contexts. Nevertheless, the lack of the capaci-
ty to reliably distinguish surrender would problematize the use of AWS in a 
wide range of militarily valuable roles. I have suggested that the lack of the 
capacity to reliably recognize surrender need not rule out their ethical use 
where AWS could plausibly be described as operating on a “tight leash,” 
such that it was appropriate to assign responsibility for surrender detection 
to the person who authorizes the release of the weapon.62 However, it is 
possible that some AWS, with more choice about which targets to engage 
and/or long periods of time between release and impact, should be better 
thought of as operating on a “long leash.” I have suggested that such appli-
cations are likely to be controversial and thus a crucial test for the moral 
permissibility of the use of AWS that are unable to reliably recognize sur-
render. While I have been unable to settle the question of the ethics of the 
use of AWS on a long leash, I have tried to clarify the arguments that might 
plausibly be made for or against them. I have also highlighted a number of 
historical analogies that are helpful for thinking through these questions. 
Finally, I have explored the connections between the issues discussed in 
this article and two important controversies in the larger debate concerning 
the ethics of AWS. 
It is possible that progress in the science and technology of artificial in-
telligence will eventually allow robots to achieve whatever standard of sur-
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render recognition we believe to be required of them. Until that day, the 
questions I have raised and tried—if not entirely successfully—to answer 
here will remain crucial to the ethics of the design and use of AWS. Given 
that the anticipated military value of AWS will establish a strong dynamic 
driving towards their deployment and use, it is vital that philosophers and 
ethicists consider these matters further. 
 
